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Anyone who lives within their means suffers from a lack of imagination. 
Oscar Wilde 
 





Projects fail. This fact, which is commonsensical and objectively true, has within the sphere 
of project studies been viewed as either a pathological state to be avoided or a logical problem 
of goal-definition. We will in this paper propose a different take on this, one that utilizes so-
cial theory and political philosophy in order to position project failure in a more general con-
text, and to analyze it as potentially beneficial. 
By  introducing  some  theoretical  perspectives  –  such  as  Georges  Bataille’s  “general 
economy”, Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous action and the political theories of Carl Schmitt 
– we thus wish to develop the ways in which project failures can be conceptualized, in ways 
that do not simply condemn such. Rather, we show how boondoggles can be analyzed and 
discussed as productive, without slipping into the vulgar relativism of “it all depends on per-




Projects fail. This fact, which is both commonsensical and objectively true, has within the 
sphere of project studies been viewed as either a pathological state to be avoided or a logical 
problem of goal-definition. We will in this paper propose a different take on failed projects, 
one that utilizes social theory and political philosophy in order to position project failure in a 
more general context, and to analyze project failure as something beneficial. In short, we will 
speak in praise of boondoggles.  
This will probably seem surprising, and  even  illogical.  Why  on  earth would anyone 
speak for failure? Particularly, why would a management scientist? The answer lies in the lat-
ter statement. As it is an incontestable fact that project failures occur, it would be unscien-
tific – and illogical – not to study them. And as they have been studied as a problem (see e.g. 
Cooper & Chapman 1987, Anell & Wilson 2003, Royer 2003), it is only reasonable that some-
one addresses the possibility that they also have positive effects, at least on some level. There 
has of course been some research on failures as arenas of organizational learning (Weick 1993, 
Petroski 1992) and failure as context dependent (Hutchkins 1991, Engwall 2002), but we wish 
to argue that these studies have all worked within a framework of optimization, i.e. they have 
started from the  assumption that management research should strive toward utopian out-
comes (see Parker 2002) and eradicate failures. We make no such assumptions. Rather we 
view project failure as a logically necessary aspect of a projectified society (cf. Ekstedt et al. 
1999), and one that must be understood and theorized if we wish to develop our understand-
ing of temporary organizing and the effects this will have on society and business at large. By 
(in a manner of speaking) engaging with project failure on its own terms, we can perhaps dis-
cuss project failure in a more analytical manner, freed from some of the desire for control and 
purified theory that has plagued project studies (cf. Lundin & Söderholm 1999).        
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However, our position should not be understood as nihilism or vulgar cultural relativ-
ism. We do not wish to propose that projects should fail, nor that we should not strive for 
successful projects. Instead, we argue for a project theory which can discuss failure in a com-
plex way, without resorting to histrionics (cf. Lindblom 1959, Kahn 1966). By taking a less 
affected stand, we could also escape some of the normative bias that plagues project studies, 
and move towards a social science of the temporary organization.  
 
Projects As Waste  
 
In our reading, the very notion of project failure may be misleading. By drawing on Georges 
Bataille’s notion of a “general economy” – originally developed in 1933 in essay The Notion of 
Expenditure and developed in The Accursed Share, first published in 1949 (Bataille 1987, 1989) – 
we propose that project failure can be seen as foundational for the economy, i.e. that projects 
can contribute to the economy specifically by failing. Adopting such a macro-level perspective 
on projects would enable us to better understand the place projects, temporary enterprises, 
have in the economic nexus, and thus better understand the manifold ways in which projects 
can be of value for society. The French theorist Georges Bataille is an idiosyncratic thinker, 
and a very challenging one. His works span from poetics to political economy, and has had an 
impact in fields such as philosophy, literary theory and organization studies (see e.g. Styhre 
2002). However, his work has seldom been referenced in project studies. As his style is highly 
original and aesthetically expressive, this is perhaps understandable, but his ideas can still pre-
sent an interesting challenge to the notion of project failure, and we shall here focus specifi-
cally on his thinking regarding economy and the place of expenditure therein. 
The general economy is a theory of economy as an open system, one driven by the ex-
penditure of energy. Thus, the notion of waste is central to the theory of the general econ-
omy. Seen from an analytical perspective, says Bataille, saving and efficiency are not the cen-
tral aspects of an economic system. Instead, they are special and restricted moves, whereas 
expenditure and excess are natural and much more common phenomena in the larger context 
of exchange. In fact, economy might not in any serious analytical sense be a question about 
efficient use of limited resources, but instead a question of different ways in which things are 
wasted. We may prefer to analyze the restricted aspects of the economy, but this does not 
take away from the fact that a power-plant exists so that we can waste energy, that a factory 
exists so that we can have an excessive amount of things, and that we work hard during the 
week so that we can throw a big party and get drunk on Friday. Waste exists, and a serious 
analytics of the economy takes this into account. Thus the theory of a general economy is not 
a question of praising irrationality, but a question of empiricism, of not framing the empirical 
world of economy according to moral preference. 
What does it mean when we talk of projects as wasteful? There are two sides to this. 
On one hand, we wish to point to a specific aspect of economy as an open system, and by this 
to the fact that failed projects can be beneficial for the general economy. A failed project can 
be seen merely as expenditure, and such expenditure is not only merely useful for the econ-
omy at large, they are critical. A large project which runs over budget and is beset by numer-
ous problems can be marvelously beneficial for the surrounding environment, which clearly 
shows that the designation of failure depends on the level of analysis. This, obviously, is well-
known, but the theorization of projects as expenditure is still lacking, opening up for an in-       
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troduction of Bataille’s thinking. On the other hand, we wish to address how wastefulness in 
and of itself needn’t be a problem in project execution. As shown by both studies of industrial 
projects (see e.g. Hughes 1998, Lindahl 2002, Rehn 2004) and known by each project man-
ager, some degree of redundancy and slack is critical for successful projects.  
Thus, the common understanding of project failure may perhaps best be understood 
within the framework of the limited economy, whilst the perspective of a general economy 
would  if  not  celebrate  failures  and  waste,  then  at  least  understand  the  necessity  thereof. 
Bataille’s concepts could thus help us to create a theorization that might not be as directly 
practical for the individual practitioner as more limited approaches, but still be more accurate  
if we actually want to understand all the ways in which projects work and affect their envi-
ronment. In other words, what Bataille could be used for is to develop a general theory of pro-
jects, and thus position boondoggles and project failures in an analytic rather than moralizing 
way. The problem, obviously, is that this may run into the problem that by being more gen-
eral, it might at the same time become all-encompassing. A more developed theory would 
thus prompt us to continue on from this, to discuss the different ways in which project failure 
can be productive. 
 
Projects and Conspicuous Action 
 
We thus now want to turn to the work of Thorstein Veblen (see Veblen 1899/1934), in order 
to analyze the concept of the boondoggle through his theorization of consumption. Using the 
concepts of “conspicuous action” and “vicarious expenditure”, we will try to show how project 
failure must be understood in relation to the way in which it occupies a symbolic space of 
challenge and salience. The ways in which projects can fail must in this perspective be read in 
relation to the context within which they fail, so that a failure may be in fact be a spectacle, a 
martyrdom or an indulgence. Put somewhat differently, a failure might not be a failure unless 
it is noted as one, i.e. unless it is conspicuous as a failure.  
Veblen became famous by publishing the magisterial The theory of the leisure class in 1899, 
a book which may well be called the seminal work of consumer studies. In this, he argued that 
the important fact of the wealthy classes was that they used consumption to signal their for-
tunes and their leisure, i.e. the fact that they consumed conspicuously. He further noted  that 
they also used their family and other dependants (such as servants and other hired help) to do 
so, such as when a rich man adorned his wife with expensive jewels, or built a lavish office for 
his underlings. This kind of consumption Veblen classified as vicarious, i.e. done though oth-
ers but in part for oneself. What was significant in this observation is the way in which he (in 
1899!) managed to show how action, such as consumption, always carries a symbolic meaning. 
In a post-industrial age, this might not strike anyone as a particularly novel insight, but it is 
important to note that a) Veblen discussed this in the 19
th century, b) project theory still 
hasn’t caught up. 
Returning to the issue of project failures, we can now ask whether they can be interro-
gated as symbolic actions. We would like to suggest that it is, specifically starting from the 
point that excess and expenditure in and of themselves aren’t enough to claim a fiasco – oth-
erwise that favorite of project researchers, the Sydney Opera House, would have been a major 
one – important to note the nature of conspicuous attribution in the design of project failure. 
Thus, the important issue is not whether a project has failed or not, but what kind of failure it        
The Pink Machine Papers #27 N




was. Take, for instance, the development of new drugs or the project of publishing a new 
novel. It is an established fact that many such projects fail, as everyone engaged in these busi-
nesses is well aware of, so the interesting thing is how we should understand these less-than-
successful projects. Clearly, they are not fiascos, as everyone knows some of the projects will 
by necessity fail. Still, some of these will be designated as failures so as to make clear that not 
succeeding is still, despite the logical necessity thereof, unacceptable – borrowing language 
from Bataille we could say they are sacrificed. Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, this 
would make these conspicuous failures important and functional parts of a project organiza-
tion. Without such vicarious failure, successful project execution would seem a fluke, almost 
an aberration.  
Failures can thus, at the very least (we can imagine many more variations), be both con-
spicuous and “naturally occurring” – the difference being that the former is in fact a beneficial 
thing to the system within which it occurs. Projects can in such a way fail for other projects, 
and in a sense become martyrs. The assignment of symbolic values to sets of actions, for in-
stance assigning a project as a failure, can be both a statement about the world and a political 
action, and the important thing is to realize the difference between these two modes. Obvi-
ously, this does not mean that failures do not exist, only that the fact of stating that some-
thing is a failure is not necessarily the same as saying that it represents something one wishes 
to rid oneself of. A failed project can even be seen as a vicarious expenditure for a successful 
one, an indulgence. 
What this means is that whilst the notion of a general economy is useful as it shows the 
necessity and positive network externalities of failure, the notion of conspicuous action shows 
that failures can actually be used. We will now turn to the political implications of this.  
 
On the Exception – Towards a Political Theology of Projects 
 
To continue, we want to adapt some notions introduced by the controversial political phi-
losopher Carl Schmitt, specifically in relation to the definition of success/failure and the no-
tion of Ausnahmezustand or state of exception. Particularly it is the state of exception that is 
of interest, since it can be viewed as an opportunity to re-describe both the means and the 
ends of the project organization and thereby defining new possible lines of action and accept-
able results. 
Exploring project execution through a lens of construction and declaration of states of 
exceptions  can,  as  we  see  it,  prove  to  be  a  fruitful  endeavor  to  expose  some  underlying 
mechanisms of the oxymoronic notion of project organization, that is, the achievement of 
action efficiency simultaneously through bureaucracy and adhocracy. Failure, as a mental la-
bel, is here an important concept. Instead of viewing failure as a possible terminal outcome 
we, as scholars, would benefit by rather seing it as a continuous process. One could even dare 
to claim that projects management is about failing, as project management as a practice gen-
erally deals with patching up a continuous array of failures, pushing the project back on track, 
rather than overseeing that it keeps on track.  
Projects, which are generally seen as the most action-oriented way of organizing, are 
despite what one might believe usually carried out under a considerable bureaucratic super-
structure built on the foundations of stability, predictability and success.  As we know, devia-
tions and reinterpretations – exceptions to a paradigmatic steady state ideal – are abundant in        
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ordinary project work. Many deviations can be and are of course dealt with within the frame-
work of established canons. There is however a point when disturbances occurring within the 
project process are of such magnitude that they no longer can be dealt with through estab-
lished protocols and routines. We may call this point the organization’s yield point, borrowing 
a term from mechanical engineering
1. Now, projects that encounter problems of such magni-
tude that they can not be dealt with according to protocol are generally on the verge of an 
organizational  collapse  (cf.  Weick  1993).  The  bureaucratic  project  organization,  a  well 
trimmed action-machine under stable and foreseeable conditions, can not deal with the situa-
tion without undermining its own base of existence: protocol. Action required to turn the 
project back on track will require a step out of the institutionalized web of intra- and inter-
organizational rules, or, the rules themselves have to be reformulated and renegotiated.  
It is with this apocalyptic backdrop in mind that Carl Schmitt, and especially his elabo-
rations on the “state of exception” (Schmitt 1922/1988), becomes interesting – for a theory of 
action in general and particularly for project theory. Schmitt’s ideas about sovereignty, poli-
tics and legal order concerned the State (especially the Weimar republic), but the general im-
plications have no less bearing on organizational life. On the contrary, since the question of 
democracy is difficult to problematize in the societal, Schmitt’s views are maybe more suited 
for the world of corporate wage labor than for society in general. In contrast to his contem-
porary colleagues, Schmitt was dedicated to reinstall the personal element of rule as a neces-
sary means to preserve the constitutional state (cf. Schwab 1970). Stripped to the bone, we 
may interpret Schmitt’s basic question as how to understand dictatorship in conjunction with 
a modern constitution, the underlying concern being how to protect and preserve the state in 
a time of hostility, distress and failure. In this regard the state of exception is of central im-
portance to jurisprudence since it a situation that to a certain extent defines the limits of law 
– or in our case, the limits of corporate protocol (see Agamben 2005).  
The state of exception can be considered as perhaps the only legitimate way to tempo-
rally abolish constitutional law and its normal magistrate. During the reign of exception a 
ruler acts as sovereign and may enforce action as he sees fit, acting in compliance with law but 
outside it. The state of exception, through its peculiar status of being both inside and outside 
the constitutional order, frees a tremendous propensity for action. In this particular circum-
stance power, specifically the power to decide and to act accordingly, is centralized into what 
Schmitt refers to as a constitutional dictatorship, where the one who can declare a state of 
exception  reigns supreme. Similarly, labeling projects as “failing” or situations as “a crisis” 
provides management with an opportunity to declare a state of exception, leaving the existing 
bureaucratic but dysfunctional infrastructure intact, and thereby momentarily increasing its 
freedom to act. Thus “states of exception” can be seen as vital mechanisms in all human in-
teraction,  but  it  is  clear  that  it  is  of  central  importance  particularly  in  a  bureau-
cratic/constitutional context. It not only stimulates action, but it enables the organization to 
save itself from calling its fundamental raison-d’étre into question. In these particular circum-
stances the organization can legitimately perform actions and reinterpret means as well as 
ends, which it has prohibited through its design of “standard operating procedures.” The or-
                                                             
1 A yield point defines the load at which a solid material begins to change shape permanently. If the 
stress is below the yield point the material returns to its original shape when the stress is removed, if it 
is above it the material suffers a permanent change in shape.          
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ganization – through the generation of “a state of exception” – improves its general possibili-
ties to act through its increased degree of freedom of action. A perspective that draws on 
Schmitt in order to understand “boondogglian” project management could, as we see it, con-
tribute to an enriched conceptualization of that oh so familiar label – action orientation – and 




So, if there are functional, even laudable aspects to failure, what is it in it that terrifies us so? 
What drives us to want to eradicate it, even though we know this is a logical impossibility, 
and perhaps even a productive part of project management? Clearly we are here confronted 
with a deeply lodged trauma, a fear of the incomplete. In a sense this text could be under-
stood, in the language of Slovene philosopher Slavoj Žižek (1992, 2000, 2002), as a “papering 
over” of this trauma, a way to handle this fundamental problem of theory. At the same time, 
we cannot even begin to discuss the trauma unless we attempt to theorize the impossible, or 
that which is viewed as the undesirable. Still, such a move is marred by the fact that the 
trauma clearly escapes theorizing, and that this text will be read either as a move towards the 
eradication of failure (regardless) or as a glorification thereof. It seems thus like an impossibil-
ity on a new level, a double bind.  
Whilst it is obvious that one part of this dilemma comes from the utopian thrust of 
much project theory, i.e. the tendency therein to attempt a perfect closure of self-contained 
organizing, this in and of itself isn’t enough to explain the trauma of project failure. Rather, 
one could suggest that the very notion of the project, as it is commonly deployed, represents a 
fetishism where “[t]he fetish is the embodiment of a lie that enables us to endure an unbear-
able truth” (Žižek 2000). The necessity of breakdown in any system, and particularly the in-
creased possibility for failure in any kind of activity that is as tightly framed as a project by 
definition is, would here stand as that abject Real that project theorization tries to avoid (cf. 
Žižek 1993). Failure in projects could be read as their hard kernel, the specific thing that 
theorization of project work tries to eradicate by way of fetishizing the project as an object of 
success. In other words, it might be possible to think all of project theory simply as a battle 
against the necessity of project failure, and the strive to eradicate failure as a symptom of a 
trauma. 
Failure would then be not a pathology, but something akin to what Žižek has referred 
to as the Real (with a capital R, see Žižek 1992) – that which is central to the constitution of a 
subject, but which escapes symbolization, i.e. that which cannot be talked about. The way in 
which the field has discussed failure (see e.g. Cooper & Chapman 1987) could then be ana-
lyzed not as actually trying to come to grips with failure, but rather as a symptom of failure as 
the Real of project studies. Any theoretical engagement beyond this point would seek not to 
solve a perceived pathology, but rather form an inquiry into the ways in which failure exists as 
a trauma. In the end, the question may hinge on our capacity for belief in the project as an 
organizational form, and further our capacity to betray it, in the sense that betrayal may be a 
fundamental aspect of any system of belief (see Žižek 2003). 
An example can highlight this: When a project researcher is faced with the fairly com-
mon circumstance of a project not going according to plan, what is she to do? A great deal of 
project theory would suggest that the correct way here would be to treat this as a mistake, as        
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something that could have been avoided. Thus, the researcher may document the failure, and 
come up with a series of suggestions regarding how such failures can be avoided. However, 
this is not an engagement with the failure. Rather, this constitutes the creation of an alter-
nate world., where the failure can be silenced or turned into a symptom of something else, 
thus moving the discussion away from the actual irreversible reality of the failure. The failure 
remains as the Real which the researcher tries to avoid engaging with, utilizing the whole of 
her theoretic arsenal to nullify it. The unbearable truth that there will always be projects that 
fail remains, but this has been papered over by recasting the failure in a fetishized form – as a 
model for treating similar (but never the same) failures. 
 
A Theory of Project Failure? 
 
What we’ve tried to argue in this text is that one can, by using social theory and political phi-
losophy, develop at least an outline of a theory that speaks of (or even lauds) the beneficial 
aspects and practical use of project failure. By not treating failure as a pathology to be eradi-
cated, we’ve tried to highlight the complexity of project work in a way that we feel would 
complement the often overly optimistic models of scholars who treat projects as an abstract 
problem of resource optimization. While being fully aware that our treatment may seem ab-
struse to many – far removed from the practicalities of project work – we contend that this is 
a mistake. Instead, it is by engaging with failure on a level that project managers are well ac-
quainted with, i.e. as constantly present and dealt with (cf. the discussion of failure as con-
spicuous action), we have actually tried to present a theory that is closer to actual project 
practice than theories who try to think away project failure. 
The development of a theory of project failure may be an impossibility, as it would be 
affected by a perfectly natural wish to do something about such failures, but the inclusion of 
analytical perspectives on project failure into existing project theory may well be possible. 
What we’ve suggested here should not be seen as a finalized version of such an inclusion, but 
as tentative notes towards such a development. The themes we’ve tried to highlight – general 
economy, conspicuous action, and the state of exception – may all serve to at least engage 
with the trauma of failure in project theory. And this is at least a first step.        
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 Pink Machine is the name of a research project currently carried out at the Department of Industrial
Economics and Management at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. It aims to study the
often forgotten non-serious driving forces of technical and economical development. We live indeed
in the reality of the artificial, one in which technology has created, constructed and reshaped almost
everything that surrounds us. If we look around us in the modern world, we see that it consists of
things,  of artefacts.  Even  the  immaterial  is  formed  and  created  by  technology -  driven  by  the
imperative of the economic rationale.
As Lev Vygotsky and Susanne Langer have pointed out, all things around us, all these technological
wonders, have their first origin in someone’s  fantasies, dreams,  hallucinations and  visions. These
things, which through their demand govern local and global economical processes, have little to do
with what we usually regard as “basic human needs”. It is rather so, it could be argued, that the
economy  at large is governed by human’s unbounded thirst for jewellery, toys and entertainment. For
some reason - the inherent urge of science for being taken seriously, maybe - these aspects have been
recognised only in a very limited way within technological and economical research.
The seriousness of science is grey, Goethe said, whereas the colour of life glows green. We want to
bring forward yet another colour, that of frivolity, and it is pink.
The Pink Machine Papers is our attempt to widen the perspective a bit, to give science a streak of
pink. We would like to create a forum for half-finished scientific reports, of philosophical guesses and
drafts. We want thus to conduct a dialogue which is based on current research and which gives us the
opportunity to present our scientific ideas before we develop them into concluding and rigid - grey -
reports and theses.
Finally: the name “Pink Machine” comes from an interview carried out in connection with heavy
industrial constructions, where the buyer of a diesel power plant worth several hundred million dollars
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